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When the European Central Bank (ECB) started its operations in 1999, ¯nancial markets
were not yet fully acquainted with the way the ECB would operate. Even though the
details of the ECB monetary policy strategy had already been made public, there was
considerable uncertainty on how the ECB would implement this strategy. Under these
circumstances, clear and coherent ECB communication was of paramount importance.
Many observers feel that the ECB has not been very successful in this respect. According
to HÄ amÄ alÄ ainen (2001), who was ECB Executive Board member at the time:
It is true that we have not always been very successful in our communi-
cation despite ambitious intentions. But communication is not easy in a
pan-European context in which di®ering cultures, languages, traditions and
motives a®ect how messages are interpreted by the di®erent counter-parties
involved.
Meanwhile, the creation of the ECB implied that the roles of national central banks
changed. The German Bundesbank, the focal point of European monetary policy for
years, became just one of the twelve national central banks within the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks (ESCB). Still, the Bundesbank had a ¯rm track record and the
reputation of a tough and successful in°ation ¯ghter. Financial market participants in
search for information on future monetary policy might, therefore, turn to the old and
trusted Bundesbank in order to gather information. In the words of a market participant:
`Bundesbank council members are probably as close as one can get to being a °y on the
ECB's wall'1.
This paper evaluates ECB and Bundesbank communication during the ¯rst years of
the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We investigate two main issues:
i) to what extent have comments by various European central bankers been di®erent
or contradictory and ii) how has ECB communication evolved over time. It may be
expected that, after some initial problems, ECB communication has improved. So, we
would expect possible dispersion in communication on monetary policy to decrease over
time. Also, we expect the role of national central banks to decrease.
Firstly, in order to study dispersion in ECB communication, we study whether dif-
ferent (groups of) central bankers have had preferences for di®erent sorts of comments.
We make a distinction between members of the ECB Executive Board (EB), national
central bank (NCB) presidents and Bundesbank policymakers. We report the topics that
were mentioned in their respective statements as well as their contents. In addition, we
construct an indicator that measures to what extent ECB comments were contradictory.
Finally, we study the distribution of statements by di®erent groups of central bankers
surrounding Governing Council (GC) meetings. The ECB may use communication be-
fore GC meetings to in°uence the public's expectations. Alternatively, the ECB may
choose to observe radio silence before GC meetings, therewith avoiding confusing ¯nan-
cial markets through its statements. We hypothesize that the ECB has chosen the latter
course. Therefore, we test whether their have been less statements before GC meetings
than after.
1Source: Bloomberg, 1 August 2001
1Our second main research question is related to changes in ECB communication over
time. In particular, we investigate whether the agreement of July 1999 between European
Ministers of Finance and central bankers to streamline ECB communication on the euro
has been successful. Central bankers, save Duisenberg, would make fewer comments, so
that ¯nancial markets would be less easily confused by ECB communication.
Most research in this ¯eld is theoretical in nature (see e.g. Morris and Shin (2002)).
This paper uses comments by central bankers as reported by Bloomberg to study central
bank communication from an empirical perspective2. We have searched the news report
archive using keywords like `ECB' or names of ECB o±cials. Using this strategy, we
have gathered 931 news reports for the period between January 4, 1999 and May 17,
2002. We organize the raw data by classifying it on the basis of the person making the
statement and the topic discussed.
Our results are as follows. We conclude that in some respects ECB communication has
improved over the years. Firstly, ECB communication on the interest rate has become
less contradictory. Also, there is evidence that ECB communication on the euro has
been streamlined over the years. In contrast, statements on in°ation and growth have
become more di®used. In addition, national central banks, in particular the Bundesbank,
continue to play an important role in communication on European monetary policy.
Finally, only the ECB Executive Board has consistently observed radio silence before
rate meetings.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the impor-
tance of central bank communication. Section 3 describes our methodology. Section 4
gives a ¯rst description of the data, whereas section 5 analyses the coherence in ECB
communication. Section 6 analyses the distribution of statements surrounding GC meet-
ings, while section 7 examines developments in ECB communication over time. Section
8 summarizes and concludes.
2 The importance of central bank communication
2.1 Theoretical considerations
We see, at least, three reasons why central banks can bene¯t from communication. First
and foremost, communication may increase the e®ectiveness of monetary policy. Clear
and consistent communication on the long-term in°ation target can be used to in°uence
the public's long-run in°ation expectations, for example. If this is done successfully,
the central bank has more leeway to respond to short-run shocks, as deviations from
the in°ation target are not interpreted as an indication of a lack of commitment ( King
(1997)). Building greater trust by communicating a long-term in°ation objective may
lead to a lesser degree of in°ation persistence, since there is a strong belief that in°ation
will return to its target level.
Kuttner and Posen (2001) ¯nd support for this view. In a study of the response of
bond markets (as a proxy for in°ation expectations) in Canada, New Zealand, and the
UK before and after the central banks in these countries adopted in°ation targeting, they
2Two papers that use a more empirical approach are Siklos and Bohl (2003) and Andersson, Dill¶ en and
Sellin (2001).The former focuses on Bundesbank communication before 1998, while the latter analyses
communication by the Sveriges Riksbank.
2¯nd that interest rates decreased, which is consistent with the view that the adoption of
in°ation targeting increases °exibility. Kuttner and Posen (1999) report similar results
for a broader range of countries: in°ation targeting reduces in°ation persistence, in
contrast to other elements of the monetary framework, like central bank independence.
However, Ball and Sheridan (2003), who compare seven OECD countries that adopted
in°ation targeting in the early 1990s to thirteen countries that did not, do not report
supportive evidence. They ¯nd that after the early 1990s, performance improved in both
the targeting and the non-targeting countries. If targeters improved more than non-
targeters, regression to the mean plays an important role: targeters performed worse
than non-targeters before the early 1990s. Once regression to the mean is accounted for,
there is no evidence that targeting improves performance.
Secondly, communication may be used to reduce noise in markets ( Posen (2003)).
Greater disclosure and clarity over policy may lead to greater predictability of central
bank actions. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty in ¯nancial markets. The results
reported by Kuttner (2001) o®er support for this point of view. Changes in the Federal
Reserve's disclosure policy have reduced market volatility and increased predictability.
Research on the predictability of ECB decisions suggests that most were in line with
¯nancial markets' expectations. Gaspar, P¶ erez Quir¶ os and Sicilia (2001) have analysed
whether the announcements of ECB decisions have a signi¯cant impact on the behavior
of overnight rates (EONIA) in Europe. Their results suggest that markets are able to
predict the ECB's interest rate decisions quite accurately over the period of analysis.
Somewhat less supportive evidence has been reported by Ross (2002) and De Haan,
Eij±nger and Waller (2004), who ¯nd that while ECB rate hikes were generally well
predicted, the markets have had more di±culty in fully and correctly anticipating ECB
rate cuts in terms of either timing or magnitude.
Last, but certainly not least, communication is important from the perspective of ac-
countability. Accountability, in turn, requires disclosure (see e.g. De Haan and Eij±nger
(2000)). Even if other arrangements concerning accountability exist, their scope is limited
without proper information concerning the behavior of central banks. Communicating
via statements is one channel through which information can be transmitted.
Morris and Shin (2002) point out that communication may, in theory, also have
detrimental e®ects. This e®ect arises from the fact that the impact of public informa-
tion is large. As a consequence, so is the impact of possible noise in the public signal.
Agents may overreact to public information and thereby magnify the damage done by
any noise. When public information becomes entrenched it begins to take a life of its
own, suppressing the private information of individual agents, and disrupting the chan-
nel through which the market mechanism aggregates and disseminates information on
economic fundamentals. Morris and Shin (2002) show that such overreaction need not
be predicated on any wishful thinking or irrationality on the parts of agents.
2.2 Perceptions of ECB communication
Even if a central bank is very active in providing information, the public may, never-
theless, feel that it does not fully understand the central bank's actions. Whether the
activities of the central bank lead to a better understanding depends on many factors.
One of the crucial factors, of course, is the quality of the information provided. No matter
how often a central bank publishes information, if the public feels that this information
3is hard to understand, the central bank is, de facto, not perceived as being transparent.
There are clear indications that ¯nancial markets initially did not have a good un-
derstanding of the ECB's strategy3. According to a survey by Goldman Sachs held in
February 2000 in which a sample of ¯nancial market participants was asked to rate on
a scale of 1 to 5 (a higher grade indicating a better understanding) how well they un-
derstood the reasoning behind monetary policy decisions of four central banks, the ECB
came out last (see Gros (2000)). Also, in a more recent survey De Haan et al. (2004),
professional economists do not rank the ECB as a highly transparent central bank.
The quality of the information is one important factor that explains to what extent
the public feels that it understands central bank communication. Another important
issue is whether the messages of various o±cials are the same. If disagreement is present,
the public may get confused. On more than one occasion, both Ministers of Finance
and central bankers issued statements about the external value of the euro that were
at times con°icting. Also, statements by ECB o±cials were sometimes considered to be
con°icting4. In order to improve upon this situation, Euro area Finance ministers and
central bankers agreed to exercise restraint in their comments about the exchange rate
in July 1999. In section 7, we analyze whether policy makers have been successful in this
respect.
2.3 Empirical studies on central bank communication
Empirical research on central bank communication is scarce. Siklos and Bohl (2003)
study Bundesbank communication over the period 1982-1998. Using data on speeches
by senior Bundesbank o±cials, the authors show that speeches are related to changes in
the interest rate. More importantly, it matters what the speech is about: communication
on prices and economic policy are more important than, for example, speeches on the
euro.
Andersson et al. (2001) examine how various monetary policy signals have in°uenced
the term structure of Swedish interest rates. Among these signals, they also rank speeches
by Riksbank o±cials. Their analysis shows that unexpected changes in the repo rate
are the most important determinant of movements at the short end of the yield curve.
However, at the long end, unexpected signals from speeches turn out to be as important
as unexpected repo rate changes. A drawback of their analysis is that over the total
sample period (1996-2001), there are only 11 identi¯ed speeches.
3This has led Issing (2001) to conclude that the ECB faces a `communication gap': `On the one hand,
few observers contest the success and credibility of the ECB in delivering on its primary objective and
on the appropriateness of most of its policy actions in this regard... On the other hand, however, the
overall perception of the ECB by the public, academics, ¯nancial analysts, market participants, and not
least, journalists continues to remain - at best - rather mixed'.
4An often cited example is when Noyer, at the time the ECB Vice-President, in February 2000 stated
that markets had been reading to much in the words of the Monthly Bulletin of that month. Analysts
expected an immanent interest rate rise. But on 24 February Noyer reversed this expectation by his
remarks. The markets concluded that a rise was unlikely at the next meeting of the Governing Council.
In reaction, the euro fell to its lowest level at the time. Indeed, the ECB did not change its rates at 2
March, but it did so two weeks later. Duisenberg explained later that one reason to wait was to avoid
appearing to overreact to the euro's weakness. According to Sims and Wessel (2000), it `still isn't clear
whether Mr. Noyer was trying to send a signal, or whether there was disagreement inside the ECB.'
Questioned recently about the episode, Noyer says he was giving `exactly the same message we have
tried to convey many times'.
43 Methodology
3.1 Data and sources
We have collected data on statements by ECB and Bundesbank o±cials using Bloomberg.
We have searched the archive of news reports by scanning the report headlines. In
particular, we selected news reports of which the headline contains a reference to the ECB
or an ECB Governing Council member. Furthermore, we also selected those statements
made by high-level Bundesbank policy makers. We have selected 931 news reports over
the period January 4, 1999 to May 17, 2002. For the analysis in section 6, we downloaded
the dates of ECB GC meetings from the ECB web-site.
3.2 Categories of statements
We classify the statements both by the person making the statement as well as the content
of the statement. Concerning persons, we focus on three groups of central bankers (the
ECB Executive Board, national central bank presidents, and Bundesbank o±cials) and
several important individuals. The classi¯cation for the topics of statements is given
in table 1. There are two main categories5: monetary policy and the euro. There are
four subcategories in the monetary policy category. First of all, there are statements
on interest rates in the euro area. Secondly, there are statements on money growth in
the euro area (the former `¯rst pillar'), economic growth and in°ation (elements of the
former `second pillar').
Table 1: Categories of ECB statements
Category: Contains statements on:
(1) Monetary policy
Interest rates ECB interest rates
M3 Growth in and level of money supply
Economic growth Real GDP growth in the euro area
In°ation In°ation in the euro area
(2) The euro
Future value of euro Expectations on the external value of the euro
Intervention The possibility of intervention
Euro as target? The position of the euro in ECB strategy
The second main category are statements on the euro. During the sample period,
developments in the euro-dollar exchange rate were widely discussed. The ECB paid a
lot of attention to the euro-dollar exchange rate in its communication for, at least, three
reasons. Firstly, politicians and central bankers had promised, more or less, that the
euro would be a strong currency. The continued external weakness of the euro was often
considered to be in contrast with this claim. Therefore, ECB o±cials had to reassure the
public that the decline of the euro was unjusti¯ed and temporary. Secondly, there has
been quite some confusion about the role of the exchange rate in the monetary policy
strategy of the ECB. Sometimes it was thought that the ECB had an exchange rate
5We mainly use the same categories as in Jansen and De Haan (2003)
5objective, which it did not. However, the ECB closely watched the external value of
the euro under what is now called the economic analysis (the previous `second pillar'),
because exchange rate shocks may lead to in°ation in the euro area. A ¯nal reason why
the ECB, no doubt, closely follows exchange rates is that there is always a risk that actual
exchange rates may be out of line with economic fundamentals. Indeed, the concerted
intervention of the ECB and other central banks at the end of 2000, was, according to an
ECB press release, motivated by the `shared concern about the potential implications of
recent movements in the euro exchange rate for the world economy.' Apart from o±cial
intervention, the ECB may try to a®ect the external value of the euro by communicating
its worries.
The ¯rst subcategory under the second main heading contains statements expressing
beliefs on the future direction of the exchange rate. The second subcategory contains
statements pertaining to the possibility of future ECB foreign exchange market inter-
ventions. Finally, there are statements explaining the position of the euro in the ECB
monetary policy strategy.
4 A ¯rst look at statements by central bankers
4.1 The ECB Executive Board
Table 2 shows classi¯cations for the statements made by members of the ECB Executive
Board (EB). Columns 2 until 5 show the number of statements on monetary policy,
whereas column 6 until 8 show statements on the euro-dollar exchange rate. The ¯nal
column shows the total number of news reports in which statements were mentioned. In
total, the EB has appeared in 360 of such reports.
From table 2, we can conclude that, in comparison with variables from the second
pillar of the ECB monetary policy strategy, M3 is hardly mentioned. Growth and in°ation
are, without doubt, considered very important by the EB, whereas they are a little more
cautious about discussing the interest rate. The ranking in terms of the number of
statements in the monetary policy category is in line with expectations: Duisenberg has
the most number of observations, closely followed by Issing.
It can be seen that Duisenberg, Noyer and Issing were quite concerned about the
external value of the euro. Not only did they often discuss the future development of the
euro-dollar rate, but they also explained that the euro's external value was not a target
for monetary policy. On the possibility of an intervention, only Duisenberg and Noyer
have made a signi¯cant number of statements.
4.2 National central bank presidents
Table 3 shows the total number of statements of NCB presidents6. Similar patterns
emerge as in the case of the EB. There is relatively little attention for M3 growth; policy
makers are more prone to talk about growth and in°ation than on interest rates.
There are a few interesting di®erences, nevertheless. The EB members made a similar
number of statements on growth and in°ation, whereas the NCB presidents made more
statements on in°ation than on economic growth. The source for this di®erence is even
6For Germany, Spain and Portugal, the presidency switched during the sample period. Therefore,






















































































































































































































































































































































































7more interesting: a quick comparison shows that it is Bundesbank president Welteke who
accounts for the di®erence. In addition, he accounts for more than 60% of the statements
on M3 growth. Put di®erently, in his statements Welteke appears to stick to the German
monetary tradition with its attention for M3 and a clear emphasis on in°ation. The other
NCB presidents seem to share his interest in in°ation: in most cases they are more often
cited on in°ation than on growth. Interestingly, the southern central bank presidents
hardly mention M3 growth. Only Papademos, currently Vice President of the ECB, is
cited on this topic.
Overall, Welteke has made the most statements on monetary policy. Not only has he
spoken more on this issue than other national central bank presidents, he also is cited
more often than any of the members of the ECB Executive Board. So, in this sense
the Bundesbank has kept its pivotal role in European monetary policy. Trichet, the
current ECB president, is also quite outspoken. He is cited, approximately, as often as
Duisenberg on growth and in°ation. Interestingly, Trichet seems to have been relatively
silent on interest rate changes. He is cited about 40 times on the ¯rst two issues, but
only 11 times on interest rates. The Belgian and Austrian central bank presidents have
also been in the news quite often. Quaden is cited relatively often on interest rates (16
times), whereas Liebscher is cited more on economic growth and in°ation (24 and 25
times, respectively).
Let us now turn our attention to the opinions of NCB presidents on the euro's ex-
ternal value. We ¯nd 52 statements on the future value of the euro against the dollar,
20 statements on interventions and 52 statements on the position of the euro in ECB
monetary policy. Once again, we ¯nd that Welteke is cited most often. During the short
part of our sample period when Tietmeyer was Bundesbank president, he has made 14
statements on the euro's value and 9 on the euro as a possible target. So, it seems that he
was rather concerned with the euro's external value. Unlike Welteke, Trichet has made
only few comments on interventions. The number of comments on the euro's value and
the euro as a target are similar for these two central bankers.
4.3 Bundesbank o±cials
As noted, the statements by Bundesbank policy makers warrant some further attention.
We have statements from members of the executive board (Direktorium), as well as
presidents of the regional central banks (Landeszentralbanken)7. Table 4 shows that the
presidents of the Landeszentralbanken have made more statements than the members
of the Direktorium (except for the Bundesbank president). The number of statements
is roughly balanced over the di®erent categories, although there seems to be a slight
preference for comments on the interest rate. Especially Meister and Kuehbacher talked
relatively often about the interest rate.
One ¯nal point is the number of statements on M3 growth. In total, the Bundesbank
o±cials are cited on 17 occasions on this topic. To put this into perspective, the ECB
Executive Board was cited only 32 times on this topic. Furthermore, the NCB presidents
were cited 17 times if we exclude the observations on Tietmeyer and Welteke. This
7Just before the end of our sample period, three presidents of regional central banks became member
of the executive board (Kotz, Reckers and Zeitler). However, since their statements were made before










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10indicates a relative preference of the Bundesbank for a monetary approach to monetary
policy, whereas ECB communication is more balanced.
Statements by Bundesbank o±cials on the euro were made by the Direktorium as
well as Landeszentralbank presidents. We ¯nd that the number of statements is rather
evenly divided between the two groups when the future value of the euro or the po-
sition of the euro in monetary policy are concerned. When it comes to intervention,
in contrast, the Direktorium made only one statements, whereas the presidents of the
Landeszentralbanken made seven.
115 Coherence in ECB communication
5.1 Dispersion at the group level
Have ECB statements di®ered in content? For example, have some central bankers been
more positive than others? We will ¯rst analyse this issue at the group level, before
focusing on some interesting results for individuals.
Table 5 shows the results for four di®erent groups: the ECB Executive Board, NCB
presidents, Bundesbank o±cials (exluding the president) and all statements in the sam-
ple. The entries in the table should be read as the percentage of the total number of
statements in a particular category. For example, the top-left entry (12.9%), indicates
that of all ECB Executive Board statements on the interest rate, 12.9% suggesting a rise
of the interest rate.
Table 5: Dispersion at the group level
ECB EB NCB Presidents BuBa a) All ECB o±cials
Rates Up 12.9 14.1 18.4 14.4
0 83.9 82.2 71.4 80.9
Down 3.2 3.7 10.2 4.7
M3 growth Up 31.3 24.0 41.2 29.3
0 37.5 42.0 29.4 38.4
Down 31.3 34.0 29.4 32.3
Growth Up 82.8 72.2 52.0 75.2
0 7.0 12.5 16.0 10.3
Down 10.2 15.3 32.0 14.5
In°ation Up 23.8 24.9 28.6 24.6
0 47.7 39.0 45.7 43.0
Down 28.5 36.2 25.7 32.3
Euro Rise 95.7 97.2 85.7 95.5
0 4.3 2.8 0.0 3.1
Fall 0.0 0.0 14.3 1.3
Intervention Pos 23.3 37.5 25.0 29.6
0 46.7 40.6 25.0 42.3
Neg 30.0 21.9 50.0 28.2
Euro as target? Pos 52.0 67.9 58.3 61.7
0 14.7 11.2 16.7 12.6
Neg 33.3 20.9 25.0 25.7
Note:
a) excluding the President
The entries in this table should be read as percentages of the total number of statements per category.
The relative small number of observations in some categories may increase the in°uence of outliers on
the reported results.
Starting with statements on the interest rate, we ¯nd that the distribution for the
ECB Executive Board and the NCB presidents is surprisingly similar. Indications of
rising rates are about 13 to 14% of the total number of observations. In by far the
majority of cases (around 82-84%) the statement is neutral in character. Bundesbank
12policy makers make fewer neutral statements and both more statements on higher and
lower rates. So, the Bundesbank has been more outspoken than the ECB.
Table 5 shows that the EB statements on M3 growth have been reasonably balanced.
The distribution of the statements is approximately uniform. In contrast, NCB presidents
have less often hinted at a rise in M3 growth, whereas Bundesbank policy makers have
pointed to rises in money supply in 40% of the cases. When it comes to economic growth,
the EB and the NCB presidents are both optimistic in the majority of cases. For the
Bundesbank, we see markedly more negative statements on growth. We see a similar
pattern in the statements on in°ation. In this case, the Bundesbank is more inclined
to point to higher in°ation than the other two groups. Finally, it is interesting to note
that the ECB EB is the least outspoken on the subject of in°ation. In almost half of
the cases they make neutral statements on this subject. The NCB presidents are a little
more inclined to indicate a lower in°ation rate.
What do we ¯nd for the statements in the second main category: the euro? Firstly, for
all three groups almost all statements are discuss the potential of the euro to appreciate
against the dollar. Of course, this was to be expected: the prolonged fall of the euro
against the dollar prompted the ECB to intervene verbally, as discussed in Jansen and
De Haan (2003). The exception, once again, are the Bundesbank o±cials. When talking
about intervention, the ECB EB generally indicated that interventions were not likely
or remained neutral. The NCB presidents have been slightly more inclined to hint at
future interventions. Interestingly, the Bundesbank seems to have been quite opposed to
interventions. Finally, all three groups of central bankers have stressed the importance
of the external value of the euro with respect to in°ation.
5.2 Dispersion: results for individuals
We now focus on the statements of some of the leading ¯gures in European monetary
policy: Duisenberg, Noyer, Issing, Welteke and Trichet. Concerning the interest rates,
we ¯nd rather similar patterns: in most cases the statement is neutral (> 85%) and in
some cases it indicated higher interest rates (10¡15%). Noyer and Welteke are the only
ones who have explicitly hinted at lower rates.
Do country-speci¯c characteristics for certain types of statements exist? When look-
ing at the category `growth', one would almost be tempted to answer this question in
the a±rmative. Consider Noyer and Trichet: in both cases almost all statements on
growth are positive in nature (92:5 ¡ 93:5%). Duisenberg is also quite upbeat on eco-
nomic growth, although to a lesser extent than Noyer and Trichet. Finally, Issing and
Welteke have also been positive in the majority of cases, but in approximately a ¯fth of
the cases they made negative statements on future economic growth.
On in°ation, Trichet turns out to be the most balanced with an almost uniform distri-
bution of statements. The other 4 persons have predominantly made neutral statements
(40 ¡ 50% of the cases). Of all persons, Issing was the most likely to hint at higher
in°ation rates, whereas Noyer pointed mostly at falling in°ation rates.
On the euro, there is little disagreement. Everyone has unrelentingly been stressing
that the euro will rise in the near future. For statements on intervention we ¯nd more
variation. Trichet has been the most consistent, as he has only made neutral statements
on intervention. Duisenberg and Issing have ruled out future intervention the most,
whereas Welteke and Noyer seem to have been the biggest advocates of intervention.
13Finally, let us look at the euro as a possible target for the ECB. It turns out that in
their statements Trichet and Noyer have emphasized the euro as a target. Actually, the
evidence is quite overwhelming: Noyer has done this in 87 % of the cases and Trichet
in 94 %. For Welteke and Issing we ¯nd similar results, although less marked. For
Duisenberg the balance tilts towards negative statements. In over 50 % of the cases, he
has emphasized that the euro is not an explicit target.
Table 6: Dispersion: results for selected individuals
Duisenberg Noyer Issing Welteke Trichet
Rates Up 15.6 14.3 15.4 10.0 9.1
0 84.4 76.2 84.6 87.1 90.9
Down 0.0 9.5 0.0 2.9 0.0
M3 growth Up 22.2 22.2 50.0 23.3 22.2
0 33.3 44.4 30.0 33.3 33.3
Down 44.4 33.3 20.0 43.3 44.4
Growth Up 84.1 93.5 72.9 66.2 92.5
0 9.1 0.0 8.3 13.5 5.0
Down 6.8 6.5 18.8 20.3 2.5
In°ation Up 17.1 14.3 34.5 23.4 30.6
0 48.8 42.9 41.8 41.5 36.1
Down 34.1 42.9 23.6 35.1 33.3
Euro Rise 100.0 96.2 100.0 97.6 96.9
0 0.0 3.8 0.0 2.4 3.1
Fall 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Intervention Pos 15.4 30.0 0.0 40.0 0.0
0 46.2 50.0 50.0 40.0 100.0
Neg 38.5 20.0 50.0 20.0 0.0
Euro as target? Pos 17.4 87.0 47.4 67.3 94.1
0 30.4 0.0 15.8 7.7 0.0
Neg 52.2 13.0 36.8 25.0 5.9
Note:
The entries in this table should be read as percentages of the total number of statements per category.
Please note that the relative small number of observations in some categories may increase the in°uence
of outliers on the reported results.
5.3 Measuring the level of contradiction in statements
The preceding results suggest that, on the whole, ECB communication has been fairly
consistent. This conclusion would certainly hold for statements on the interest rate.
However, until now we have not studied possible contradictions in comments that were
made closely after one another. To analyse this, we examine statements on interest rates,
in°ation and growth during periods between GC meetings8.
To measure the extent of disagreement in ECB statements, we construct an indica-
tor that is bounded between zero (no disagreement) and one (complete disagreement).
Firstly, we use a ternary scale to categorise the statements on the interest rate, in°ation
and growth. A score of -1 means that the variable is said to go down (for example, lower
in°ation in the Euro area), a zero indicates a neutral statement and a score of 1 indicates
8This means that, in general, our event window is a two-week period.
14a rise in the variable (for example, a higher interest rate). The indicator is constructed
as the total distance between the scores divided by the maximum total distance between
the scores9. For example, in case of three statements, the maximum distance equals 4.
If one central banker states that the interest goes up, while the other two suggest that
they will remain the same, the scores are: 1, 0 and 0. The total distance between the
statements equals 2 and the indicator equals 0.5.
Figures 1 and 2 show the development of the indicators based on statements for
interest rates and in°ation10 over the years 1999 until mid-2002. Three conclusions stand
out. Firstly, considerable disagreement between ECB statements has indeed existed.
This is especially true for statements on in°ation. Secondly, over time, the inconsistency
in communication on the interest rate has diminished. One might argue that fewer
statements on this subject have been made, thus reducing potential disagreement. Quite
the opposite is true, as the number of statements on interest rates has in fact increased
over the time period under consideration. Finally, the indicator for in°ation shows that
disagreement has actually increased over the years.
Summarizing, it seems that the ECB communication has improved only partly. On
the most important policy instrument, there is more clarity. However, on the two most
important policy goals, there is more di®usion11.
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9The maximum distance is calculated as 0:5n2 if n is an even number and 0:5((n2)¡1) if n is an odd
number, where n denotes the number of statements.
10Results for statements on in°ation and growth (not shown) are similar.
11One might argue that the results are in°uenced by our inclusion of ECB and Bundesbank statements.
However, the analysis gives similar results when the Bundesbank comments are excluded. Results are
available upon request.
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6 Statements surrounding GC meetings
6.1 Did the ECB observe radio silence before GC meetings?
On a bi-weekly basis, the ECB GC meets to discuss monetary policy. The number
and nature of statements surrounding rate decisions may be of prime importance for the
e®ectiveness of monetary policy. In general, a central bank may choose to prepare markets
for the upcoming decisions by giving certain hints in its statements. Alternatively, before
rate meetings there may be relatively few statements in order to prevent turbulence in
¯nancial markets. In this latter case, the distribution of statements around rate meetings
will be skewed towards more statements after rate meetings than before.
Figure 3 displays the number of statements on interest rates per day for the Exec-
utive Board, NCB presidents and Bundesbank o±cials12. The pattern over time can
approximately be characterized as a sinusoid. For the EB, there is a peak on the Fridays
preceding GC meetings with a total of nine statements. Subsequently, there is a relative
calm over the weekend with 3 statements on Saturdays and 4 on Sundays, before a rise
on the Monday to 11 statements. Thus, there evidence suggests that the EB restricts
communication in order to prevent turbulence in ¯nancial markets.
In this respect, there is a stark contrast with the other two groups of central bankers.
On Tuesdays and Wednesdays before GC meetings there were 12 and 10 statements by
NCB presidents and 7 and 8 statement by Bundesbank o±cials, respectively. So, radio
silence was not strictly observed by these parties.
After the ECB has announced its policy decision on the interest rate, statements are
important for two purposes: explaining and, once again, predicting future policy. On the
three days after the GC meeting, the EB dominates the news reports. In the week after
the GC meeting, the NCB presidents make the most number of statements by far (14 on
Mondays and 18 on Tuesdays). The Bundesbank o±cials keep a low pro¯le during these
12Note that, due to possible overlapping observations, we can only use the six days before and after a
rate meeting. Therefore, the total number of statements in ¯gure 1 does not correspond with the ¯gures
in tables 2, 4 and 6.
16days.



























6.2 Radio silence: results
To test formally for di®erences in communication after and before rate meetings, we
use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for matched-pairs 13. De¯ne xb
i as the number of
statements on the i'th days before a Governing Council meeting and xa
i as the number of
statements on the i'th day after a GC meeting. We perform a one-sided test of the null
hypothesis that the distributions of xa
i and xb
i are equal against the one-sided alternative
that the distribution of xa
i is displaced over that of xb
i for i = 1:::6. The test results for
di®erent categories of statements are displayed in table 7. The third column presents
the average di®erence between the pairs xa and xb. The fourth column presents the
Wilcoxon T+-statistic.
Regarding the EB, ¹ xa
i ¡ ¹ xb
i is positive for all cases except intervention. For growth,
in°ation and the euro, the di®erence is statistically signi¯cant. In a way, this is surprising.
One could imagine the ECB to have been fairly careful with statements on the interest
rate. In addition, statements on growth and in°ation may have been used to prepare the
markets for upcoming decisions to some extent. Our results suggest that the opposite
has occurred. Finally, for the NCB presidents, the only signi¯cant result emerges for M3,
while for the Bundesbank o±cials, we ¯nd no signi¯cant results.
13See Marascuilo and McSweeney (1977) for a description of this test and a tabulation of critical values
for the T+-statistic.
17Table 7: Testing for radio silence: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
Group Topic ¹ xa
i ¡ ¹ xb
i Wilcoxon T+
Executive Board Rates 2.3 16






National central bank presidents Rates 1.7 11






Bundesbank Rates -2.3 4







The entries in the third column give the average di®erence between the respective number of statements
on days after and before a GC meeting. The entries in the fourth column are the resulting T+ statistics
from the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Since we have n = 6, the critical values for the appropriate one-sided
test are 18 (10%), 19 (5%) and 21 (2.5%) respectively. */**/*** denote signi¯cance at the 10/5/2.5%
level
187 Did the emphasis in communication change over
time?
7.1 Distribution of statements over time
How did ECB communication evolve over time? Did o±cials talk more about a certain
topic during particular periods? Is there evidence that the agreement of July 1999 to
streamline communication has been successful? We answer these questions by computing
the average number of statements per day for each half year in the sample period. Table
8 reports the results. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
A quick inspection of table 8 su±ces to conclude that there is no clear reduction in the
average number of statements over the sample period, as far as the four monetary policy
categories are concerned. In contrast, in most cases the average number of statements
has risen during the sample period.
Consider, for example, the statements by the EB on interest rates. During the ¯rst
half of 1999, the average number of statements per day was 0.06. During the ¯rst part of
2002, this ¯gure had risen to 0.08. In the meantime, it had been equal to or more than
0.06 in all but one period (2000-II). For both the NCB presidents and the Bundesbank
o±cials, we ¯nd that the average number of statements has risen. The same conclusion
hold for statements by the EB and the NCB presidents on growth and in°ation. During
the ¯rst half year of 1999, the average number of statements on growth for these groups
were 0.06 and 0.02, respectively. For in°ation, we ¯nd averages of 0.02 and 0.02. During
the sample period, the averages follow an upward trend to levels between 0.15 and 0.25
in the ¯rst half of 2002.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that the NCB presidents have become less impor-
tant in ECB communication over time. Compare, for example, statements on the interest
rate. During all periods, the average for the NCB presidents is equal to or larger than
that of the EB. Except for statements on growth and in°ation this conclusion holds for
other categories of statements as well.
Turning to statements on the euro, we do ¯nd evidence of a reduction the number of
statements. The future value of the euro clearly received more attention during the second
half of 1999 and 2000 than in later periods. The same conclusion hold for interventions
and the euro as a possible target. However, over time these topics receded from public
discussion. These observations taken together may be interpreted as evidence in favor of
the success of the July 1999 agreement: central bankers made fewer statements on the
euro.
19Table 8: Average number of statements per day
1999-I 1999-II 2000-I 2000-II 2001-I 2001-II 2002-I
EB Rates 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.08
(0.25) (0.29) (0.26) (0.20) (0.30) (0.34) (0.27)
M3 growth 0 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03
(0) (0.26) (0.07) (0.13) (0.22) (0.15) (0.17)
Growth 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.18
(0.23) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.43) (0.34) (0.46)
In°ation 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.10 0.15
(0.18) (0.45) (0.38) (0.32) (0.46) (0.34) (0.40)
Euro 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.05
(0.26) (0.38) (0.33) (0.27) (0.18) (0.27) (0.22)
Intervention 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0 0
(0.11) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.10) (0) (0)
Target 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.04
(0.27) (0.33) (0.28) (0.39) (0.13) (0.20) (0.19)
NCB Rates 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.14
(0.27) (0.29) (0.37) (0.20) (0.42) (0.41) (0.37)
M3 growth 0 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.04
(0) (0.23) (0.16) (0.23) (0.31) (0.19) (0.19)
Growth 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.23
(0.13) (0.33) (0.34) (0.36) (0.47) (0.63) (0.53)
In°ation 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.27 0.27 0.23
(0.17) (0.37) (0.41) (0.42) (0.58) (0.55) (0.45)
Euro 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.40) (0.29) (0.47) (0.29) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)
Intervention 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.02 0 0
(0.08) (0.10) (0.28) (0.27) (0.15) (0) (0)
Target 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.08
(0.27) (0.28) (0.46) (0.38) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30)
BuBa Rates 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.03
(0.08) (0.15) (0.22) (0.13) (0.27) (0.27) (0.17)
M3 growth 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0
(0) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.22) (0)
Growth 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.01
(0) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.23) (0.12)
In°ation 0 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01
(0) (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) (0.28) (0.22) (0.00)
Euro 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Intervention 0 0 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.01
(0) (0) (0.15) (0.13) (0) (0) (0.08)
Target 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0
(0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0) (0.07) (0)
Note:
This table displays the average number of statements per day. Results are reported for three groups:
Executive Board (EB), national central bank presidents (NCB) and the Bundesbank (BuBa). Standard
deviations are reported in brackets.
208 Conclusions
This paper has examined communication by European central bankers during the ¯rst
years of EMU. We have studied to what extent statements on monetary policy in the Euro
area have been contradictory. We ¯nd evidence of considerable noise in communication
on European monetary policy.
Firstly, we provide evidence that the Bundesbank and national central bank presidents
have made as least as many statements as members of the ECB Executive Board. There
is no evidence that this trend has been reversed over the years. A situation in which
information can emanate from many di®erent sources is more likely to lead to confusing
messages. Indeed, we ¯nd clear evidence that statements on interest rates, in°ation and
growth have been contradictory. On the bright side, confusion in interest statements
has diminished over the years. Also, there are less instances of confusing statements.
However, when in°ation and growth are concerned, disagreement has clearly increased
over the years.
Finally, we provide evidence that di®erent groups of central bankers have followed
di®erent communication strategies surrounding ECB Governing Council meetings. The
ECB Executive Board is the only group that has tried to observe radio silence before GC
meetings. Both for national central bank presidents and Bundesbank o±cials, we ¯nd
no evidence that they communicate less before rather than after GC meetings.
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